Ankita Meena v. University of Delhi: Are Legal Stringencies Justified in case of Welfare Legislation?
ANKITA
MEENA V. UNIVERSITY OF DELHI: ARE LEGAL STRINGENCIES JUSTIFIED IN CASE OF
WELFARE LEGISLATION?
Pragya Jain, 2nd Year,
Gujarat National Law University
Editorial Note: In this blog
post, the author considers the fallacies of the decisions of the Delhi High
Court and the Supreme Court in Ankita Meena v University of Delhi, viewing the
issues which arise from the perspective of their potential impact on society.
The
very essence of a professional course such as law is denuded when it lets
stringency and inflexibility shroud the path of advancement for a female
student. This is especially true in India, where women’s education remains a
cause of much concern and serious deliberation. In India, the issue does not end
with awareness campaigns in rural areas, as it fails to soak into the social
fabric of urban families desperate to ensure that their daughters are
marriageable, with their being obedient creatures being valued over the
prioritization of their goals. In a
diabolical situation such as this, education should assist and not prevent
educational growth for women in our country. It is therefore, surprising how Delhi
High Court’s[i]
stringent reading of the letter of law, strict interpretation and reliance on
past precedent in the case of Ankita Meena v. University of Delhi seem to taken
us a step backwards in light of gender issues groping the society.
Ankita Meena
was a diligent second year L.L.B. student at Faculty of Law, Delhi University
who was detained from taking her semester IV exams due to shortage in
attendance as per the Bar Council Rules. The shortfall of attendance which
resulted in such debarment was on account of Ms. Meena being pregnant during
the relevant period of time. In this blog, the author seeks to explore the legal
aspects of the decision by Hon’ble Justice Rekha Pallias well as the verdict of
the Supreme Court bench in an SLP preferred by the petitioner in addition to
briefly delving into its sociological impact.
The
primal issue in this case is conflict between the following rules:
Rule
2 (9) (d) of Ordinance VII of Chapter III of Delhi University states that,
“In the case of a married woman student who
is granted maternity leave, in calculating the total number of lectures
delivered in the College or in the University, as the case may be, for her
course of study in each academic year, the number of lectures in each subject
delivered during the period of her maternity leave shall not be taken into
account.”
On
the other hand, Rule 12 of the Rules of Legal Education of the Bar Council of
India[ii]states
that,
“No student of any of the degree program
shall be allowed to take the end semester test in a subject if the student
concerned has not attended minimum of 70% of the classes held in the subject
concerned as also the moot court room exercises, tutorials and practical
training conducted in the subject taken together.”
Both
the High Court and the Supreme Court have approved the precedence of Rule 12
because it is a mandatory provision for a professional degree while the Delhi
University Rules are general and it is a well established legal principle that
when there is a conflict between a specific and general law, it is the specific
law that dominates the arena. The problem with this interpretation is that by
virtue of it, the welfare intent of Rule 2(9)(d) which is in consonance with
Article 15 of the Constitution,[iii] which supports the making of laws and
policies that encourage the growth of women, is completely bypassed. The
reasoning relied on may be generic, nevertheless, the surrounding circumstances
compel analysis of not just the conflict between the aforementioned provisions
but the general impact that the outcome entails for the general society as well.
It
is interesting to note that apart from this, the High Court also placed
reliance on two decisions, namely those of Vandana Kandari[iv]
and Sukriti Upadhya.[v] It
seems that the former sought to settle the issue of whether maternity benefit
can lead to relaxation in attendance requirements in a course.According to that
decision of the same Court, maternity leave could not be put in a different
compartment for the purposes of relaxation of attendance. This rationale of the
Court seems to be backward looking, especially in these times when corporate
laws are being amended time and again to make workplaces as women friendly as
possible, with a recent change extending the maternity leave period to 26 weeks
of paid leave. These efforts are based on the understanding that a company’s
profit and performance depends on their employees. If companies stop giving
maternity benefits to female employees, not only would they potentially lose an
employee, but they would also become perpetrators of discrimination against
women who choose to have a baby. On a similar note, educational institutions
and professional bodies must also align their specifications with the
constitutional vision of equality and ensure that their stringency must not bar
equality in its approach.
Secondly,
the university provision that promotes education of pregnant women is rendered
redundant because of the holdings of the High Court in the case of Sukriti Upadhya where it was clarified
that the University of Delhi would be required to bring its rules in conformity
with the rules of the Bar Council of India as the Bar Council of India is a statutory body constituted
under the Advocates Act[vi]which recognises the LL.B.
degree course of the University of Delhi and is empowered to lay down standards
of legal education. There is thus, no benefit accorded to those women who pursue
a legal course from Delhi University as the rules of the professional body
subjugates all other general rules.
It is true that one cannot stress enough on the
dire need for imparting quality legal training to students of law in the
country to bring them at par with their international counterparts. It is also
undeniable that it is important for students to attend classes and participate
in activities such as moot courts in pursuance of their legal education.
However, in the fact and circumstances of this case, one must accord due
weightage to the fact that Ankita had been a diligent student throughout the three
semesters she attended classes and even her attendance record of the preceding
semester of a remarkable 86% sheds light on her commitment to her education.
The law must not penalize a person’s situation. It is therefore, argued that in
all probability, Ms. Meena would have continued to attend
classes at college if she had not conceived during the period under discussion
and her spirit needs to be promoted in a country where not just female
education but even legal education needs growth and protection.
The Supreme Court has reasoned similarly in the Special
Leave Petition filed by the aggrieved petitioner but there still remains hope
in the case as it has allowed for an appeal to the division bench of the High
Court.Another reason for the Supreme Court to rule against the petitioner was
that they could not have issued an order which could not have been materialized
as the DU
counsel arrived at 1 pm and said it would not be possible to accommodate her in
just one hour. Evidently, Ms. Meena’s only fault in the entire scenario was
that she did not apply for maternity leave in advance.
Interestingly this is not the first time that Indian courts
have encountered such a situation. In fact as recently as last year, a Kerela
High Court ruling laid down that a woman’s
decision to expand her family“cannot
be ground for "wriggling out of the conditions of a regular academic
course.”[vii] This is a problematic
position in the Indian context for two major reasons. Firstly, in a patriarchal
society like ours, often, the decision to have a baby depends on the male
spouse and pressure is exerted by the marital family on the wife. Secondly,
biological nature of conception may require a pregnant woman to dedicate
substantial time to taking care of her health and by cutting a woman’s access
to professional growth for this reason, the law is also interfering in the
woman’s means to livelihood and the ability to provide for her child. This is
particularly dangerous for the lower classes of our country, where due to poverty
and unemployment, several men turn to alcoholism and domestic violence which
ultimately leads to an ugly separation. Who will care for the child now? In
such a case, it is the child who has to bear the brunt of neglect because the country
of his birth will penalize his or her mother for having him or her.
A counter argument to all those advocating in favour of
removal of such draconian provisions is that it is unfair to those students who
regularly attend classes and fulfill all requirements of the professional course
to which they are engaged. I urge those contemplating the merits of such an
argument to consider that the entire legal system is based on one tenets of
rationality and reasonableness. The introduction of such an idea potentially
changes the manner in which women are ‘permitted’ to plan their professional
and personals lives. Thus, it is urged that the decision of the Court in Ankita Meena’s case should be
reconsidered since it is the nature of our society that calls for such positive
discrimination to ensure that there is departure from another greater
injustice.
[i]Ankita Meena v. University of Delhi, W.P. (C) 5194/2018, 15.05.2018.
[ii]Rules of Legal Education, 2008, Rule 12(d).
[iii]The Constitution of India, 1950, Art.15(3).
[iv]University of Delhi v. Vandana Kandari,2010 (3) SCT 363 (Delhi).
[v]Sukriti Upadhyay v. University of Delhi, MANU/DE/2600/2010.
[vi]The Advocate’s Act, 1961.
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